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BOOK REVIEWS
CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDrroR.

By Ven Country-

man. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964. Pp. lxiii, 841. $12.50.
The teaching of courses in creditors' remedies, as well as the practice of law in that field, has always been severely handicapped by the
lack of useful literature. As Countryman understates it in his preface,
"the field does not abound with reference works of outstanding
reliability and perceptivity."' Bankruptcy books are to be found, of
course, but the few treatises on state creditor process and problems
have been outmoded for decades. Most were of little value when
new. Why is there so little of value in this not unimportant field
when publishers are able to produce duplications in others? No
doubt there are several reasons. Most important, probably, is that
the law is so widely varied from state to state, and so antiquated,
intricate and burdened with pointless technical niceties that only a
scholar of great energy and great talent could master the field.
To understand the importance of Countryman's book it is necessary
to understand the nature of the beast which he has sought to handle.
Countryman recognizes that creditors' remedies are an aspect of procedural law rather than of substantive law; i.e., the procedure for
enforcing judgments against debtors.
The antiquation and the intricacy mentioned above are not indigenous only to this area of enforcement law; they were common to
all areas of civil procedure not very long ago. Until the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, the most "modem"
procedural systems in the country were more than three quarters of
a century old, and many even more ancient. Because procedure was
so closely regulated by statute, there was little of the cross fertilization
by case law innovation that permits one state to profit by another's
experience. The breakthrough of the federal rules had several important consequences. Most often mentioned was the creation of a
valuable model for the states. A greater contribution was the reexamination of fundamental propositions and the assembling of
experience from all sources within, and even without, the nation.
Procedural objectives as well as devices to achieve those objectives
were re-evaluated. The result is that procedures for obtaining a
judgment have been greatly reformed in the past quarter century,
and even those states which elected not to adopt the federal model
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wholesale have profited by its existence and by -the studies upon
which it is founded.
The same cannot be said of procedures for the enforcement of
judgments. Although the Judicial Code contains some fragmentary
provisions on execution, 2 it is on the whole subject to the command
of Rule 69 that "The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings on and in
aid of execution shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held. . . ." Rule 65
makes the provisional remedies, including attachment and garnishment, "available under the circumstances and in the manner provided
by the law of the state in which the district court is held.. . ." Failure
of the federal venture to engage in reform of enforcement procedures
is hardly to be criticized; the subject is so entangled with state property law that genuine revision would have threatened involvement
with the "substantive" 3 rights of litigants as well as with the then less
clearly seen prohibitions of the Erie doctrine.
The state reformers have less excuse for their failure to act, but
at least there are understandable reasons. They had neither the
stimulus nor the enlightenment of a federal model; often they were
inhibited because they too were proceeding under a rule making
power rather than by legislative revision. But the few. which essayed
a more comprehensive revision of judicial procedure did little more.
New York looked at New York law4 and suggested a few improvements and simplifications; Michigan did about the same. 5 In its
overhaul of judicial procedure Kansas did some streamlining of attachment and garnishment,6 and its revision of the pleading and
practice sections and the adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
make its laws as current as any in the nation. Yet the same chapter
of the session law which works this reform re-enacts another article
preserving exemptions for "all spinning wheels and looms" as well as
for "one yoke of oxen."7 The ideas of the field, as well as the words
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2001-07 (1958). Even within these sections there are references
to state law. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2005 (1958) (appraisal of goods before execution if required by state law); 28 U.S.C. § 2007 (1958) (imprisonment for debt on same terms
as allowed under state law).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958), provides that rules adopted under the authority of that
section "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."
4. See generally N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW AND RuL.s. For the basic studies, see Weinstein, Proposed Revision of New'York Civil Practice, 60 CoLvm. L. Rnv. 50 (1960);
Distler & Schubin, Enforcement Prioritiesand Liens, 60 COLum. L. RFv. 458 (1960):
I do not mean that New York's effort failed, or that its studies are not valuable. They
did, however, concentrate more on curing mechanical defects than in fundamental reexamination.
5.Revised Judicature Act of 1961, 21 MIcH. STAT. ANIN. 27A:101-9911 (1963).
6. 1963 Kan. Laws ch. 303, art. 7,
- 7. 1963 Kan. Laws ch. 303, § 60-2304 (4), (5).
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in which they are expressed, are historic relics. Students in many
states must examine fieri facias not to learn what went before, which
is a worthwhile pursuit, but to learn what the law now is, which is a
disgrace.
Perhaps the lack of literature is the reason for the stagnation in
enforcement law while other areas of procedure have been revised
and revitalized. As noted, there are no current treatises. Most of the
periodical literature is highly parochial-it is easy to find treatments
of garnishment in Oklahoma or homestead exemptions in Ohio, but
remarkably little that examines basic predicates instead of explaining
how to live with an existing statute.
Because the project would be so immense and the incentive so
small, no one person can undertake to become the master of this
field and to produce the kind of fundamental studies that would be
required for reform. The federal rule making apparatus seems unlikely to move in that direction, and indeed should not. Two of the
largest and wealthiest states have recently gone through major reforms of procedure that left the enforcement of judgments virtually
untouched. Thus, there seems little promise that conventional research sources will focus on this area. And most of them lack one
capacity that is indispensable-an understanding of actual practice as
well as of statutes and case law. This requires funded field research
to supplement the intuitions of competent scholars, and that necessity
restricts the competent sources to the institutional researchers. Among
these the best candidate seems the American Bar Foundation. This
kind of inquiry and this kind of purpose should be the prime concern
of that institution, for here is a central problem in the administration
of American justice which no one can doubt has been long neglected
but about which nobody else can be induced to care enough to commit
the resources necessary for the job. This project would be far better
suited to both the capabilities and the responsibilities of a foundation
representing the profession than studies of the European Common
Market, even if there is risk that complete disclosure may reveal that
the legal profession has here done more harm than good to the society
it is sworn to serve.
Countryman's book is remarkable as a casebook because it does do
something about this inadequacy of the literature. The gap is far too
great for any one book or any one man to remedy, of course, but
this book does as much as could be done within the limits of its size
and its purpose. There was a time when books designed for classroom use in law schools were edited. In recent years there have been
a few striking examples of coursebooks that are authored instead. A
rough check of Countryman's book indicates that less than half of the
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printed matter is reproduced cases. A small part of the rest is reprinted textual matter, most of it prior writing of Countryman himself. The remainder is note material. Not the notes which consist of
excerpts from cases, or the "see also . . ." and "for another view" so
common when casebooks began to become "Cases and Materials on
• . ." These are genuine compositions, most of them carefully thought
out, with references to authorities considering the points. The notes
are the distinctive thing which prompted the comments at the outset
of this review-this casebook is a significant contribution to the literature of the law of creditors' remedies. It identifies most of the problems which arise under state creditor process systems, points out the
various solutions which are reached, and gives enough cases for leads
and virtually exhaustive coverage of the periodical literature. I claim
a working familiarity with the best of the older writing and awareness of, if not familiarity with, most of the more recent. The citations
are there, even when the problem is on the fringe of the field. I have
written (or co-authored) three articles which fall within this area.
Two are cited and the problems they discuss explored, although one
is only peripherally related. The third article is absent. Unfortunately,
so is the problem, although it is of some practical significance and
has provoked a fair number of cases at the appellate level. This is
the question of severance of joint tenancies in real property by process
directed against one of the joint tenants. Conceptualism and purpose
there sharply collide.8
This omission-really an oversight, I suspect-might be thought
serious in some settings. In the context of the Countryman book, so
panoramic in its range, the topic is scarcely missed. Doubtless there
are other omissions. Probably they are no more serious. I have
taught all of the existing books in the field, including a progenitor
of this one.9 I have always had to supplement and to raise problems
on which the book provided no coverage. Teaching this book in the
equivalent of a two semester hour course, I found virtually no need
to raise a problem for which I was unable to supply a reference

within the casebook.
The book, then, is a splendid reference work. It is a valuable addition to a library, whether of a practitioner or a professor. I venture
that even those who elect not to use this book for classes will make
substantial use of it in preparing for classes.
8. See Swenson & Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 MINN. L. lEv. 466,
493-503 (1954). Nor do I find anything on the related but distinguishable problem of
garnishment of joint bank accounts. There is a short note on the simpler problem of
tenancy by the entireties. CoumvmAN 41-42.
9. MooRE & CoUNmymAN, DEBTORS' AND CnDrrons' BRainrs: CASES AN

(1951).

Despite the ancestry, the books are very different.
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All of these points relate to use of the book for other than its primary reason for existence. How does it teach? I used it under optimum circumstances for making such a judgment; in a new state, after
not having taught the course for several years. I was thus about as
dependent on a casebook as one gets. I was well satisfied. One
measure of its quality is that for the first time I have the feeling that
thirty class hours is adequate (if only barely so) for the course in
creditors' remedies. The notes proved to be an efficient way of covering terrain and preparing students for class discussion of the significant issues involved; not infrequently they turned out to be sufficient
in themselves to dispose of a subject with minimal mention. In short,
I liked the book and would use it in preference to any existing alternative.
This general satisfaction does not preclude a few reservations, however. The most significant one relates to the distinctive feature of the
book, the compendious notes. Countryman expresses in the preface
the hope that they will "present problems more efficiently and at least
as provacatively as would a more extensive use of cases." 10 As already indicated, I thought the book taught efficiently, but I doubt
that the notes are as provocative as they could be. (I do concede that
for third year students they are as effective as cases for that purpose.)
The notes are predominantly informative in tone and content. They
are more effective in answering questions than they are in defining
issues. They are not the "problem" type notes which have been
used, with varying success, in casebooks produced in recent years.
Other reservations are less serious. Most can be coped with by
readjusting the order of materials. I did have trouble assembling
enough material and in enough depth, to get across any coherent
ideas about jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases. The material is scattered,
and the main note on summary jurisdiction" is densely packed and
very difficult. But the other
reservations I have are of that order and
2
of even lesser dimension.'
10. CournYMAN vii.
11. CouNTR
390-92. Treatment of the plenary jurisdiction is found in COUNTRYMAN 633-34 n.3, 648-50 n.5. There are other more minor mentions of these problems,
which are difficult to teach even with the best of materials all in one place.
12. I think that Countryman is sometimes wrong in his conclusions, but any man
who ventures to say as much as he does in as little space is bound to be wrong a few
times. And it doesn't really matter; my students enjoyed sometimes coming to conclusions of their own which they thought better than his.
There are remarkably few misprints for a first printing. I found only one that was
misleading: Green v. Powell, cited as 46 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), on page
40, is a Missouri rather than a Texas Civil Appeals case. This was momentarily disconcerting, for Texas law is contrary on the point. But there are very few users to
whom the error would matter at all.
I cannot resist saying that the type set of the book seems almost deliberately designed
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In summary, this is different from the books that have been produced before. It would be a worthwhile accomplishment even if no
course in creditors' remedies were offered in American law schools.
For course use, it is less a casebook than it is a do-it-yourself kit from
which a first class teaching tool can be assembled. The result is well
worth the effort.
RONAN E. DEGNAN*

SUr ME COURT ON TniL. By Charles S. Hyneman. New York:
Atherton Press, 1963. Pp. IX, 308. $6.50.

THE

Professor Hyneman's book represents still another entry in the current debate over the proper role of judicial review in a democratic
society.' Although he approaches this subject via an analysis of several
recent attacks upon the United States Supreme Court, Professor Hyneman essentially deals with the same topics-the legitimacy of judicial
review, the proper standards applicable to constitutional adjudication,
and the alleged departure of the school segregation cases 2 from those
standards-that have served as the subject of several books and at least
a score of articles published within the past five years.3 Indeed the
writing in this area has grown so voluminous that it is difficult for
anyone except a full-time student of constitutional law to read it all.
Accordingly, any evaluation of a new book in this area must take into
account the "competition." Judged in this light, The Supreme Court
on Trial, while a fairly interesting and possibly useful volume, hardly
ranks as "essential reading" for the lawyer who is interested in the
subject of judicial review. Professor Hyneman obviously has produced
to be of as little aid to the eye as possible. I doubt that Professor Countryman had
any choice about this.

*Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
1. A more complete description of this debate may be found in Shapiro, The Supreme

Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral Principles, 31 GEO.
WASir. L. REv. 587 (1963). In many respects, the current debate is merely the latest
chapter in a long standing controversy over the proper function of the Court. See, e.g.,
the literature cited in Sutherland, Book Review, 74 HAul. L. REV. 197 n.3 (1860). See
also BouniN, GoVRN mm

By JuDicIlRy (1932).

2. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 484 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
3. See, e.g., BicxEL, THE LFAsT DANGEROUS BIANCH: THE SUPREmE CoURT AT THE
BAR OF PoLrrics (1962); BLAci, THE PEOPIE .A) TH CouRT: JUDIcIAL REVIMV IN A
DEmocRAcY (1960); MAsON, Tm SUPREmm CoimT: PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM (1962);
MENDELsON, JUsTIcES BLAcK AND FRANxs'RTm: CONFLICT IN THE COURT (1961);
COURT AND THE QUEST FOR
RosTow, THE SovEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SupREN
LAw (1962); WECEsLER, PmEcSim, PoLrrcs AND FUNDAMzNTAL LAW (1961).
Various law review articles are collected by Shapiro, supra note 1, at 587 n.1. See

also Wright, The Supreme Court cannot be Neutral, 40 TExAs L. Rmv. 599 n.2 (1962).
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a better work than several other authors dealing with the same topic, 4
but, in my opinion, his contribution still falls far short of the excellence of the best literature in this field.5
One favorable aspect of Professor Hyneman's book is that the several
sections into which it is divided, unlike the segments of some generally superior books,6 are tied together by something more than the
fact that they deal in some general way with the Supreme Court.
The forty chapters in The Supreme Court on Trial are divided into
five major sub-books, each of which builds progressively toward the
final conclusions offered in part five, titled "Judicial Power and Democratic Government."
In the first sub-book Professor Hyneman carefully examines recent criticisms leveled against the Supreme Court, concentrating primarily on the criticism which stemmed from the school segregation
cases. He describes in detail the various forms this criticism has taken
and notes that such criticism has ample precedent in similar attacks
which have been made in every significant period of the Court's history This leads him to conclude that the nation has not lived comfortably under dramatic demonstrations of judicial power 7 and that,
in part, this has been due to a "widespread suspicion" that the power
of judicial review was never intended by the founding fathers but
was usurped by the courts. 8
Whether there is any reasonable justification for suspicion is the
concern of the second sub-book. After examining the language
of the Constitution, the writings of the founding fathers, the reasoning
of Marbury v. Madison,9 and the arguments of commentators, Professor Hyneman finds that, "men who fear extensive judicial power may
reasonably cling to a conviction that a doctrine of judicial review was
not originally incorporated in the Constitution but was grafted onto
it by subsequent practice." 10
In part III the author considers another basic line of attack against
the Court, the frequently raised charge that it has "cross[ed] the
boundaries of judicial power and invad[ed] a realm intended exclusively for the political branches of government."" He finds that the
basis for such charges lies in the significant policy-making power
which is almost inevitably a part of constitutional interpretation. As
4. See e.g., BLOCH, STATES' RIGHTS: THE LAW OF ThE LAND (1958); Nichols, An
Appeal To Save Our Vritten Form of Government, 13 DE PAUL L. REv. 15 (1963).
5. See, e.g., BICKEL, op. cit. supra note 3; BLAciC, op. cit. supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., ROSToW, op. cit. supra note 3; WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 3.
7. HynmmAN, THE SUPRMM COURT ON TuAL 31 (1963).
8. Id. at 84, 123.
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. HYNEMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 114.
11. Id. at 129.
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an illustration of the Court's past exercise of this power, Professor
Hyneman describes in detail the' shift in the judicial interpretation
of the due process and interstate commerce clauses during the nineteen thirties.
Turning from policy-making in the past to policy-making in the
present, Professor Hyneman presents in part IV the heart of his bookan analysis of the school segregation cases. Building upon the points
made in previous sections, the author concludes that the school segregation decision has carried judicial review, and consequently judicial
policy-making, to a "new peak of judicial power." 12 He stresses that,
unlike the significant cases of the past, such as the laissez-faire decisions of the thirties, the ruling in the segregation cases does not
merely confirm the status quo by preventing new reforms, but operates affirmatively to force a highly significant social change upon
society. Professor Hyneman apparently feels that the Court in this
decision has travelled farther into the "domain" of the legislature
than ever before; thus, opening up the possibility of a "new regime"
in constitutional law. The author views this potential new regime as
the offspring of the philosophy of "judicial activism." Accordingly
he closes section IV with a lengthy description of this "conatemporary
13
school of thought" and its "plea" for "aggressive judicial review."
In the concluding sub-book, part V, Professor Hyneman considers
the desirability of judicial activism as compared to a judicial process
which leaves significant policy making to the political process. Professor Hyneman notes that the latter alternative has the advantage
of being more democratic and more efficient. Legislatures not only
are more responsive to the people, but, because of their ability to
move on a step by step basis, to back up when they have gone too far,
and to limit new rulings to a prospective application, they are also a
more effective body for the institution of social reform. Professor Hyneman notes that some would prefer. bold judicial action precisely because the Court is not completely res-p-onsive to the popular will and
therefore better suited to limit majority excesses. Although he does not
flatly reject this position, Professor Hyneman's negative reaction is
clearly indicated by his description of its proponents as painting a
"picture of the Supreme Court as a wise father, admonishing his children to a higher morality by reading appropriate verses from the
Scripture." 14 Professor Hyneman has difficulty with the 'argument
which justifies bold judicial action-'on the ground that -the inaction
of the political branches has left the judiciary -as the only body able
12. Id. at 198-99,
13. Id. at 217.
14. Id. at 245.
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to make secure the democratic process. The author is somewhat
skeptical of a court's ability to determine when legislative inaction
truly signifies a failure of the political process. Moreover, while he
questions any group's ability to fix the outer limits of the democratic
process as they apply to our institutions,15 he feels that the legislative
judgment in this area is at least equal to that of the judiciary.
Although Professor Hyneman professes to do no more than state
the arguments on both sides, the concluding sections of The Supreme
Court on Trial make it obvious that he finds the arguments in favor
of judicial self-restraint stronger than those in favor of judicial activism. This book review is hardly the proper vehicle for a profitable
discussion of the merits of this conclusion, or, for that matter, even
for a discussion of the author's basic assumption that the common
classifications of "judicial self-restraint" and "judicial activism" accurately reflect a true dichotomy in basic judicial philosophy rather
than just a difference in the degree to which particular judges hold
sacred certain constitutional rights. 16 What can be considered in the
limited space available is this: accepting the author's assumptions
and his predilections, has he made the most convincing presentation
of his point of view that can be made, or, of more importance to the
potential reader, has he made the most convincing presentation that
has been made to date. On both counts, I feel the answer is clearly
"no." Though The Supreme Court on Trial has several strong features,
it contains too many major defects to be recommended as a primary
source-book for the lawyer who is interested in exploring the basic
issues raised by the current debate over the proper role of judicial
review.
One such defect is the author's lack of discrimination in his choice
of arguments. Frequently, he detracts from strong arguments by
giving equal (and sometimes even greater) emphasis to weaker arguments, several of which are so attenuated that it is doubtful whether
they should have been mentioned at all. This quality is strikingly
illustrated in the arguments advanced to support the author's conclusion that the critics of the Court have a reasonable basis for
suspecting that the establishment of judicial review in Marbury v.
Madison constituted a usurpation of power not granted to the judiciary.
In analyzing the Marbury case Professor Hyneman concentrates primarily on the question, also stressed by Chief Justice Marshall,
15. Id. at 268.
16. See, e.g., Kadish, A Note on Judicial Activism, 6 UTAH L. REv. 467 (1959);
MeWhinney, The Great Debate: Activism and Self-Restraint and Current Dilemmas in
judicial Policy Making, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 775 (1958); Rodell, Judicial Activists, Judicial Self-deniers, Judicial Review and The First Amendment-or, How to hide the
melody of what you mean behind the words of what you say, 47 GEo. L.J. 374 (1959).

1964 ]

BOOK REVIEWS

whether the Constitution was meant to be "paramount" law (i.e., prevailing over contrary legislative acts). The author concludes that opponents of judicial review may "reasonably" take comfort from the
fact that Marshall, in reaching an affirmative answer, "offered an
appeal to generalized experience' as his initial support and turned
only secondarily to the language of the Constitution itself.'7 Surely
the concept of what constitutes "reasonable" support for a position
is strained to the limit when the order of a judge's argumentation in
an opinion is given such significance. It is hard to understand why,
instead of emphasizing this point, indeed, instead of stressing so heavily
the question of whether the Constitution was intended to be paramount law, Professor Hyneman did not concentrate on the point generally recognized to be the weakest link in the argument for judicial
review'-Marshall's premise that, accepting the Constitution as paramount law, the Court's interpretation of that law should be binding
upon co-equal branches of the government.19
Another significant defect in The Supreme Court on Trial is that
too frequently it contains the very flaw which the author complains
of in the work of others, namely that it is "long on argument and
short on evidence."20 Of course, many of the conclusions in a book
of this type are not capable of proof, but too frequently Professor
Hyneman has either failed to offer any evidence, or has offered dramatically insufficient evidence to support conclusions which must be
supported by something more than logic.21 For example, it is Pro17. HYNEMN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 97, 124. Professor Hyneman's analysis
throughout this section goes only to the question of whether anyone could reasonably
doubt the constitutional legitimacy of judicial review and not to the question of
whether the case for judicial review might not still be more convincing than the case
against it. Id. at 93, 113-14. 117-26. Compare BLAms, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1-27.
18. See, e.g., BicKEL, op. cit. supra nce 3, Pt 2-14; BLAcK, op. cit. supra note 3, at
13-16, 26-27; HAND, THE BiIL oF BIGHTs 7-10, 27-30 (1058).
19. Professor Hyneman does recognize this problem at one point, HYNEmAN, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 120, although he does not discuss the possibility of allowing each
branch of the federal government to judge the constitutionality of its own actions.
Some commentators have found support for such a system of "concurrent review" 'in
the writings of Thomas Jefferson. See Krislov, Jefferson and Judicial Review: Refereeing Cohn, Commager and Mendleson, 9 J. Pun. L. 374 (1960); Mendleson, Jefferson
on judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Krisloo, 10 J. Plt. L. 113 (1961); Mendleson,
Jefferson on Judicial Review: Consistency Through Change, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 327
(1962). See also Hand, op. cit. supranote 18, at 3-4.
20. HYNEmAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 244.
21. It should be acknowledged that in at least a few instances the absence of documentation is most understandable. For example, in discussing the Court's unanimity
in the school segregation cases, the author cites a "widespread conviction -among lawyers and other close "observers of the Court that the Supreme Court judges were far
less in agreement than [Chief Justice] Warren's [opinions] would indicate." Id. at 211.
Professor Hyneman has been sharply criticized by one reviewer for' his- failure to cite
"which lawyers and which other close observers" hold this conviction. The absence ,of
such references, -in 'that xeviewer's opinion, reduces Professor -Hyneman's statement
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fessor Hyneman's view that "throughout our history" much of the
criticism of the Court has stemmed from a "significant social doubt
that power to overrule Acts of Congress was conferred on the courts
by the Constitution."' 2 Yet, to support this position he offers little
inore than the statements of fourteen supporters of the Roosevelt
court-packing plan who declared that judicial review of congressional
legislation constituted a usurpation of power. Certainly, such a limited
number of statements, coming within a single period of time, can
haidly substantiate a general conclusion as to the nature of the criticism against the Court from the days of Marbury v. Madison to the
present. Another example of the author's apparent lack of interest
in furnishing evidentiary support for his conclusions is found in his
citation of only a single "illustrative" article to document a rather
dubious statement that "the leading law reviews today" are "dominat[ed]" by the view that "the Supreme Court is chief custodian of
the nation's conscience and it must be supreme in saying what that
conscience requires." 23 In a few instances, moreover, Professor Hyneman has not provided the reader with even a single citation to support his conclusions.2 4 Thus, he offers no support for his statement
to "mere . . . scuttlebut." Fellman, Book Review, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 449 (1963).
It should be noted, however, that this very bit of "scuttlebut" has been advanced on
the basis of "information that has filtered out [of the Court]" by one of the closest and
most careful observers of the Court. See Lewis, New Look at the Chief Justice, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 19, 1964, § 6 (Magazine), p. 9. Moreover, while the sources of such "scuttlebut" are not identified by Professor Hyneman-possibly because it was felt unnecessary since all they had to offer for publication was their own speculations-the arguments which'support their conjecture are clearly stated and it is primarily on these
arguments, not the authority of others, that the author relies.
22. HYNEm AN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 92. See also id. at 123. But see Barron,
Decision Without Power-The Dilemma of the Supreme Court, 40 NonTH DAKOTA L.
REv. 57, 60 (1964) ("presently . . . [the Court's] power of judicial review is rarely
questioned"); Kurland, Book Review, 28 U. Cm. L. Rv. 188 (1960) ("the argument
.. . that the court has improperly usurped the power of judicial review is no longer
urged by any except those mired in the deep South.")
23. HYNvmA, op. cit. supra note 7, at 196. The article cited, Miller & Howell, The
Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 661 (1960), is
hardly typical of the current literature as indicated by the articles referred to in note 3
supra. See also Golding, PrincipledDecision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 CoLm.
L. Ruv. 35, 36 n.6 (1963).
24.. This diiregard for documentation has carried over to the author's description of
the conclusions reached by others. See, e.g., HYNEMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 100, 102,
165, where the author describes the position taken by "lawyers of considerable reknown," "students of American History," and "some writers on constitutional law" but
fails to give any references to the authors whose work he is describing. This shortcoming is overcome in large measure by the bibliographic notes in the appendix to the
book. In fact, to the general reader, the bibliographic notes are probably of much
greater value than would be the documentation of the author's general statements.
There are several instances, however, in which the author's descriptions of the views
attributedcIto others are subject to question, and, at least here, citations should have
been',furished. E.g., id. at 165, where it is stated that "some writers on constitutiongl law have stretched these facts [of the Jones & Laughlin case] into a con-.
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that "there are many... opinions [of the Supreme Court] in which
fear of future enactments is offered as a main reason for holding the
present enactment invalid."25 This is hardly a matter so obvious to
any student of constitutional law that no citations are needed. In
fact, I am somewhat puzzled as to what cases Professor Hyneman
had in mind when he made his statement.
Although Professor Hyneman's disregard of the need for evidentiary
support of his conclusions is often disconcerting, probably the most
serious defect in his book is a somewhat related tendency to oversimplify, usually by overgeneralizing. In his description of judicial
activism, for example, Professor Hyneman attempts at times to convert the position of a single author into a basic premise of what he
considers to be a whole school of jurisprudence. Thus, he states that
it is a good guess that virtually all students of constitutional law who
think of themselves as judicial activists share the view that "the failure by the State to bar discrimination [by private citizens, organizations, and business firms] is state action denying the equal protection
of the laws."2 It seems very unlikely, however, that more than a
handful of those described as judicial activists would support this
approach to the state action problem.27 In fact, a leading member of
what Professor Hyneman would call the "activist" wing of the Court
has clearly rejected this viewpoint,2 8 and the author cited as the
source of this position only advanced it as one of several possible
approaches to the state action issue.P Professor Hyneman's tendency
to oversimplify is also illustrated by his description of various Court
decisions in the 1930's. For example, in describing the Court's "turnabout' during that period, the author places his emphasis upon the
impact of the Roosevelt court-packing plan and makes no mention
of those factors which have led some commentators to conclude that
the later decisions upholding New Deal Legislation would have been
made even if the Roosevelt plan had never been announced. 30 Similarly, Professor Hyneman characterizes the Iones & Laughlin "subclusion that the Supreme Court will never again hold a national statute invalid on the
ground that it is not necessary and proper to an enumerated power or encroaches on a
power reserved to the states."
25. Id. at 208.
26. Id. at 219 quoting in part from Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAN . L. REv. 555, 569 (1951).
27. Certainly the general literature on the state action problem, both by so-called
"activists" and "passivists," does not reveal much support for this view. See, e.g., the
various articles. cited in Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 Sup. Cr.
REv. 101, 115 n.41, 116 n.42, 129 n.73, 134 n.80.
28. See the opinion of Justice Black in Bell v. Maryland, 375 U.S. 918 (1964).
29. See Hyman, supranote 7, at 569-70.
30. See MeWhinney, supra note 16; Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 311 (1955).
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stantial relationship" test 3' for determining the scope of the commerce
power as providing the Supreme Court justices with "a greater invitation to enthrone their own judgments ... than they can find in earlier

opinions."3 He does not, however, acknowledge that substantial
variation in 33viewpoint had also existed under the "standards" of those
older cases.
Despite the defects mentioned above, Professor Hyneman's book
may still have a significant value, if not to the lawyer, at least to the
person who has no previous background in the study of constitutional
law.3 4 Viewed solely as an attempt to explore the current debate over
the role of the Court, to trace its history, and to present the arguments on both sides (with the author's own conclusions clearly indicated) in a fashion understandable to one "new to the study of constitutional law," 35 The Supreme Court on Trial has many favorable
aspects. While it contains little that is new, the book does cover all
the major points brought out by others, and it does so in an interesting manner which is often an improvement over the original presentation. It also presents clearly and in detail all of the background material, particularly the historical material, which a reader must have in
order to appreciate the basic issues being debated. Finally, although
the book does contain some ambiguities, the author generally avoids
the very general, very ambiguous discussions so frequently found in
this field.36 His discussion of judicial activism, for example, though
lacking in other regards, does go beyond a broad, vacuous description
and attempts to relate this philosophy to various substantive constitutional doctrines. Of course, even as a book aimed at the general reader,
The Supreme Court on Trial still has several drawbacks. There is, for
31. NLRB; v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937): "Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot
be denied the power to exercise that control."

32.

HYNEmAx,

op. cit. supra note 7, at 165.

33. See, e.g., The opinion of the Court and the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 278, 317 (1936). It should be noted that
there. were dissents not only when the "older cases" invalidated congressional legislation but also when they upheld legislation as within the commerce power. See, e.g.,
Chicago, Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 43 (1923); Houston, East & West Ry.
v.. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342, 360 (1914).
34. Professor Hyneman never makes clear the exact audience for which this book
was written. Since it is based on the Shambough Lectures in Political Science delivered
at Iowa State University, I assume it is aimed at readers who already have some
familiarity with the constitutional law field. On the other hand, certain statements in
the book might indicate that it is designed primarily for, people who, as the author
puts it come "new to the study of constitutional law." HYNEmAN, Op. cit. supra note 7,
at 171.
35.--Ibids.
u..
36. But see Feilman, supra note 21.
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one, still the problem of overstatement and oversimplification. Nevertheless the overall picture presented by the book is sufficiently accurate to give the lay reader a general appreciation of the dilemma presented by judicial review in a democratic society, and what is lacking
in subtlety of argument and accuracy may be compensated for by the
author's clear and vigorous style of presentation.
JEROLD ISRAEL*

AmEcAN CONSTIUTIONS (1963 ROSENTHAL LECTURES).
By Wilbur G. Katz. Northwestern University Press, 1964. Pp. 114.
$3.50.

RELIGION AND

In these three amazingly comprehensive lectures on contemporary
church-state problems Professor Katz of the University of Wisconsin
Law School 1 centers his discussion on this crucial issue: should the
state be neutral towards religion or should there be a strict separation
between church and state?
Professor Katz, former Dean of the University of Chicago Law School,
and widely known for his many thoughtful and balanced articles on
the "establishment" and "free exercise" clauses of the first amendment,
argues in these carefully chiselled lectures on behalf of a state neutrality towards religion that would not, however, result in an absolute
or strict separation of church and state. Professor Katz analyzes the
twin forces opposed to state neutrality, first, on the part of those who
assert that the state must assist religion and, secondly, on the part of
those who seek to forbid all state action which, however incidentally,
might render some assistance to religion.
One's first reaction to Professor Katz's definition of neutrality is to
associate it with the well-known test advanced by Professor Philip
Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School. Professor Kurland
in his volume Religion and the Law argued that the two clauses of
the first amendment "should be read as a single precept that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion either
to confer a benefit or to impose a burden."2
.Professor Katz appears to accept the Kurland thesis, but not as a
principle without exceptions; the Katz hypothesis is neutrality but
with an understanding that the state should be an institution which
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. Professor Katz is also the chairman of the National Commission on Church-State
Relations of the Protestant Episcopal Church.
2. KunLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 18 (1962).
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"does not give preference to secularism and is actively concerned for
religious freedom." 3 One may legitimately raise the question whether
the Katz hypothesis can really co-exist with the Kurland line of reasoning. Professor Katz urges persuasively that "neutrality" will effectuate
the purposes of the first amendment more fully than "strict separation." But one is left with the intuition that both Professors Kurland
and Katz are advancing words to make the thrust of the first amendment conform to their own prepossessions. Such attempts are, of
course, by no means reprehensible and indeed are commendable.
But the impression remains that the first amendment is neither selfexplanatory nor self-executing but will almost inevitably become the
instrument by which a particular view or vision of society will become a legally established reality.
Professor Katz puts his principle of neutrality to severe tests in his
second and third lectures. He measures the concept of state neutrality
towards religion against the complex problems of religion in public
'education and of tax-support for church-related schools.
Neutrality, according to its definition by Professor Katz, would
appear to agree with the holding of the United States Supreme Court
in McCollum v. Board of Education banning released time religious
education from the premises of the public school. But neutrality
would apparently sanction released time off the school premises as
permitted in Zorach v. Clauson,5 only if the issue of institutional pressure and coercion, obfuscated in the Zorach litigation, were satisfactorily resolved.
Neutrality would also endorse the decisions, if not all of the reasoning, in Engel v. Vitale,6 Murray v. Curlett,7 and School District v.

Schempp.8 The neutrality thesis would insist, however, that although
the state cannot teach religion via the public school, the state can,
and indeed must, teach about religion. Professor Katz is more aware
than most writers on church-state issues of the fact that the public
school which is silent about religion in effect advances and even
"establishes" secular humanism.
Professor Katz is also unusually realistic about the asserted "divisiveness" of any form of religion in the public schools. With his
characteristic candor, Professor Katz concedes the possibility of exacerbating religious differences by having courses about religion in
the public schools. In answer to this fear of "divisiveness," Professor
3. KA~z, RELIGION AND A.&mucAN CONSITTIONS 22 (1964).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

333 U.S.
343 U.S.
370 U.S.
374 U.S.
374 U.S.

203
306
421
203
203

(1948).
(1952).
(1962).
(1963).
(1963).

19641
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Katz offers two challenges which are in fact the crucially important
questions not answered by those commentators who would forbid
released time, "shared-time" and even teaching about religion on the
grounds that the mere presence of these programs will have a divisive
-and presumably deleterious-effect on students enrolled in a public

school.
Professor Katz asks pointedly:
Are we to interpret the First Amendment on the assumption that serious
hostility is the norm in interfaith relations and that legislatures and school
boards should therefore be enjoined to take note of religion only by staying
away from it?9

The neutrality position advocated by Professor Katz is, in his own
words, "based on the assumption that American religious pluralism
is not so charged with hostility that religious issues must be avoided
by enforcing a rigid principle of separation." 10
Professor Katz, however, is willing to have some "divisiveness" in
the public school if this is the necessary price that a society must pay
"for the maintenance of religious convictions.""
With regard to religion in the public school, it appears that the
Katz neutrality formula supports all the major decisions of the Supreme Court on this matter-from McCollum to Schempp-with the
exception of the 1952 Zorach opinion wherein the Court developed
a rationale of "accommodation" between the public school and the
spiritual needs of its young pupils. Professor Katz seems to feel that
Zorach does not really leave the state in a position of neutrality as
between religion and irreligion-as was argued, of course, by the three
dissenters in Zorach, Justices Jackson, Frankfurter and Black.
Nevertheless, Professor Katz would permit released time off the
school premises if one could assume that released time "programs
where students are unconditionally dismissed would be no less
successful."12
Professor Katz does not develop a reply to the contention of some
proponents of religion in public education who reason that the "free
exercise" of religion is infringed if a majority of the students are forbidden to participate in religious exercises during school hours. The
sensitivity of Professor Katz to claimed, infringements of religious
freedom does not cause him to see merit in the argument advanced
by such writers as Bishop James Pike and Dean Erwin Griswold to
9. KA-rz, op. cit. supra at 55-56.
10. Id. at 56.
11. Id. at 56, quoting from Address by Rev. James A; Pike, General Theological
Seminary, May 22, 1951.
12. Id. at 50.
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the effect that a protest against religious exercises by a minority
should not be permitted to interfere with the rights of the majority
to exercise their religious faith. Underlying this difference of viewpoints is the basic issue of the extent to which the public school is or
should be exclusively the instrumentality of the state. If the public
school is deemed to be the creation and agent of the state as are the
post office and the army, then parents and children should not be
permitted to have any opportunity to manifest their religion during
their hours as "functionaries" or "co-agents" of the state. On the other
hand, if the public school is thought to have some responsibility to be
a part of the community it serves, then a rigid no-religion policy is
not entirely appropriate. It may be that until this fundamental question is resolved, those advocating the policy of no aid to religion will
continue to contend with those favoring mere neutrality without
either of them reaching the really basic question from which all of the
legal and constitutional questions derive.
The Katz thesis when applied to church-related private schools
translates into a policy of permitting limited aid to these institutions.
In this matter Professor Katz has opinions similar to Professors Mark
De Wolfe Howe and Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., of the Harvard Law
School who, along with Professor Katz, were requested in 1961 by a
Senate committee to give their views on the controversy then raging
over the constitutionality of federal aid to church-related schools.
These two professors stated that they could find no barrier in the
federal constitution to the inclusion of sectarian schools in general
grants for nonreligious purposes. This is the position endorsed by
Professor Katz, and, in his judgment, it is entirely consistent with his
neutrality approach to church-state relations. Professor Katz, however, does not subscribe to the idea that it would be unconstitutional
for Congress to give aid to public schools alone.
Although Professor Howe in 1961 expressed his opinion that grants
to church-affiliated schools would be constitutional, he also volunteered
his opinion that as a matter of policy, "it would be a mistake to make
provision at the present time for aid to private elementary and secondary schools." Professor Katz appears not to share this viewpoint
on the policy question; he firmly advocates aid to Catholic schools
so that, in his words, "the present situation of injustice" 13 will be
eliminated.
Professor Katz seeks to answer-in a way concededly too brief-the
objection that tax support for the nonreligious aspects of a Catholic
school almost inevitably gives aid to the Catholic Church. Two un13. KA7Z, op. cit. supra at 85.
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developed arguments against this allegation are noted by Professor
Katz:
(1) A denial of support to private schools is in effect the adoption
of a policy which assumes that church-related schools should be discouraged. Before such a policy is adopted, it should be realized that
"there are some disadvantages... in policies which tend to promote
conformity and uniformity through a monolithic system .... [Moreover] it is not yet clear that public education can avoid promoting
14
secularism.'
(2) A denial of aid to Catholic schools on the grounds that such a
subsidy would in effect strengthen an institution not devoted to religious freedom cannot be justified. Statements on religious freedom
by the American hierarchy, scholarly defenses of religious liberty by
Catholic scholars and the forthcoming, hopefully vigorous, pronouncement on this issue by the Vatican Council all serve to persuade Professor Katz that the Catholic stand on religious freedom does not
supply a "sufficient reason for the withholding of equality in programs
of aid to education."' 5
Professor Katz would be the first one to concede that he has not
confronted all of the difficulties inherent in the application of the
concept of neutrality to the multi-faceted problem of the wisdom of
granting public aid for private schools. The fundamental difficulty
which readers of these three lectures will have is the apparent contradiction between the endorsement of "neutrality" and the qualification that the state must protect and even foster religious freedom.
Mr. Justice Stewart defined neutrality as requiring "a refusal on the
part of the state to weight the scales of private choice." 16 This definition would appear to be consistent with Professor Katz's view, but it
is not certain that it really advances one's understanding of neutrality
or simply enunciates another broad principle subject to the many
widely differing interpretations which are advanced regarding the
purposes of the first amendment. Similarly, Mr. Justice Clark's endorsement in Schempp of a "wholesome neutrality" contributes little
if anything to an understanding of what would be an "un-wholesome"
neutrality.
But if this slender but significant volume from the gifted pen of
Professor Katz raises more doubts and misgivings than its author
can resolve, we can confidently await further writings on church-state
matters from Professor Katz.
14. Id. at 78.
15. Id. at 85.
16. Id. at 103, quoting from Abington School Dist. V. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 295
(1963).
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The essence of the concept of neutrality explored by Professor Katz
in these essays can perhaps be summarized in his own words where

he states that he supports:
a principle of neutrality-not neutrality for its own sake, but neutrality in
order that religion may have freedom-and not only external freedom from
restraint, but also the interior freedom which is literally essential to the
religious act .... 17

REv. ROBERT F. DBiNAN, S.J.*
17. Id. at 85-86.
*Dean, Boston College Law School; author, Religion, The Courts and Public Policy.

